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Krzysztof Jasiewicz
Summer research project (June 11 to August 22, 2002) financed by:
Glenn Grant, Washington and Lee University;
Short Term Travel Grant, International Research and Exchanges Board;
Summer travel grant of the Central Europe/Russia Task Force, Global
Partners Project of the ACM, ACS, & GLCA
Reluctantly European? Ideological and Structural
Sources of Euro-Skepticism in Poland
Ever since the demise of the Soviet bloc, Poland’s membership
in the European Union has enjoyed wide support among the Polish
public. In a poll conducted by CBOS in October 2001, 56% of the
interviewed responded that they would vote "yes" in a
referendum on Poland joining the EU; 24% would vote "no,"
and the remaining 20% were undecided. Yet this level of support is
considerably lower than that recorded in the mid-1990s.
Among Polish political elites, throughout the 1990s, all major
parties (post-communist and post-Solidarity alike), shared a virtual
consensus in favor of a quick accession to the European and Atlantic
structures. Poland achieved one of her major goals in this respect
in March 1999, when she was accepted as a member of NATO. Yet in the
September 2001 parliamentary election, the Euro-skeptical forces
recorded significant gains. From an unquestionable objective of
Polish foreign policy, Poland’s membership in the EU has become an
object of political debate.
On the level of political elites, the anti-European resentments
are voiced in particular by Christian-Democratic and nationalist
parties. Fundamentalist Catholicism and ethnic nationalism generate
rejection of the EU as allegedly based on "materialism,"
secularism, and "cosmopolitanism," which, once Poland
becomes a member, would destroy her national identity and the
religiosity of Polish people. Yet the preliminary evidence from
public opinion polls suggests that the variance in the popular
attitudes toward European integration stems rather from structural
then ideological factors. Pro-European attitudes are positively
correlated with social status (education, occupation, income) and
place of residence, and negatively with age; Euro-enthusiasts
dominate almost completely among well-educated young urban
professionals, but remain a minority among poorly educated, older
peasants.
This project, using the existing data sets from surveys and
public opinion polls, explores both ideological and structural
sources of Euroskepticism, to assess the potential of the two
generating, under one banner, an orchestrated anti-EU effort before
the referendum on Poland’s entry to the EU (scheduled tentatively
for 2003).
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